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Problem: Paying for Conservation
Payment for conservation or ecosystem services (PES)
has emerged as a prominent policy tool to motivate
conservation and support poverty alleviation in lowincome countries.

1. How do communal payments for environmental
conservation impact household land-use behavior and
livelihoods?
2. What happens when payments stop?

Results
PES motivates households to change their land-use
behaviors; these conservation behaviors may be
sustained even when payment stop.
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Context: Payments in Ecuador
In Ecuador, the government started a PES program in 2009
to support conservation and alleviate poverty on communal
lands.




•

Communities sign a 20-year
conservation contract: reduce
grazing, no agriculture, fire or
hunting on collective lands.
Communities receive
collective payment per area
conserved. Average of
$20,000 per year.
Communities collectively
decide how to spend payment.

In 2016, the Ecuadorian government abruptly stopped
payments.

Data Gathering: Fieldwork 2012-2018
Leader interviews n=44 treatment/ 23control (2013 & 2018)
12 in-depth case studies (7 treatments/5 control)
Focus group discussions; Timeline; Mapping; Transect walks
HH interviews, n=911 (2013 & 2018)
Landcover analysis 2000, 2010, 2018
Analysis
Difference-in-difference and logit models
Institutional analysis of governance changes
Visual interpretation of air photos and satellite images

Sharing our Results

HH Grazing over Time

Payment programs are highly controversial, particularly
when contracts are made with communities, not
individuals.
 Effective tool for conservation and poverty alleviation?
 Equitable and just for all community members?
 Sustainable: what happens to conservation and livelihoods
when payments stop?

Methods

Our Research Questions

In the first stage of the
program, PES contributed to
an additional 12% decrease in
grazing when compared to
non-participating households.
Result based on Difference-indifference model, n=776,
R2=.22

With communities: This summer we worked with SU
students to share relevant results with the communities
where we work.
 Communal maps;
 Workshops
Ecotourism
Climate change

Control

After payments stop, preliminary results indicate grazing continues
to decline more in PES communities when compared to control.

Strong communal governance conditions are critical for
attaining desired conservation, livelihood, and equity
goals.
52% of households perceived net benefits from participation, but
communal organizational capacity matters for equity and inclusion.

In poorly organized
communities,
households fail to
have information,
receive benefits, or
perceive the
distribution is fair.

With Ecuadorian practitioners and policymakers via
presentations and executive summaries of findings.
With academics
Use your phone to see
our publications
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